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BEHAVIORAL DECISION THEORY IN THE COURT
OF PUBLIC LAW
Samuel Issacharofft
I
THE PROBLEM OF THE PUBLIC DOMAN

The introduction of behavioral decision theory into the domain
of public law is methodologically problematic. To date, behavioral decision theory has been defined by its ability to fashion a richer set of
understandings of human cognition. Its focus has been on the heuristics employed by individuals to reason under conditions of uncertainty. Its prime insight has been the paradoxical nature of human
decisionmaking and the attendant difficulties that this presents for
models of social interaction that assume a parsimonious set of motivations and behaviors. Its methodological foe has been the narrowly
constructed Homo economicus, a creature that lives in an entirely rational world of unmediated and uncomplicated motivations and consequent conduct.
Thus far, however, this newly evolving Homo behavioralishas lived
in a fairly atomized world in which social interactions are designed
primarily to determine the cognitive processes that affect individual
decisionmaking. As revealed in his preferred habitat, the experimental lab setting, Homo behavioralis exhibits a variety of predictable and
endearing traits that set him apart from the crudely drawn Homo
economicus. This richer behavioral individual predictably overvalues
what he has as opposed to what he could have, overestimates his view
of himself and his surroundings and assumes that estimation to be
shared by others, is unable to forecast his preferences or desires into
the future in a consistent and organized fashion, views the present as
inevitably the product of ambiguous events in the past, takes a Panglossian view of the status quo as presumptively the best of all possible
worlds, and so on. In short, he is an appealing if somewhat foolish
individual who we may readily see reflected in ourselves and others.
The focus of this behavioral approach has been on gaining a
richer sense of the internal mechanisms employed by individuals in
negotiating the complex decisional pathways that life throws at us. To
date, however, the literature has had relatively little to say about the
t Harold R. Medina Professor in Procedural Jurisprudence, Columbia Law School.
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role of institutional mechanisms that may buffer or even neutralize
defective heuristics that can dominate individual decisionmaking.
Some studies have sought to approximate the learning presumably associated with repeat play by contrasting professional judgments with
those shown by one-time players in the laboratory setting, with only
preliminary and inconclusive results.' But the experimental literature
is almost devoid of studies seeking to establish how behavioral insights
would translate into complex institutional settings. 2 While it is possible that institutional actors would simply mirror the heuristic biases of
individuals, there are strong reasons to believe that they might not. As
Professors Rachlinski and Farina point out, despite the frailty of
human judgment and the difficulty of accurately assessing lowprobability, long-term risk, bridges rarely fall 3-a tribute to the ability
of professional and governmental standard-setters to build in excessive capacity. Similarly, the introduction into law of behavioral insights has reinforced a number of legal doctrines by showing how they
4
conform to an intuitive sense of human decisionmaking.
The absence of a richer empirical understanding of decisionmaking in institutional settings should dictate a fair degree of caution in
applying behavioral insights in the domain of public law. Public law
differs markedly from private law, in which behavioral insights may be
harnessed to develop institutional responses that assist the ordering of
private decisionmaking. Public law, by contrast, exists only in the in1
See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, DifferingPerceptionsof Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 979, 980 (1994); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics,
and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REv. 77 (1997).
2

There are a few exceptions that have started to explore institutional behavior. See,

e.g., Chip Heath & Nancy Staudenmayer, CoordinationNeglect: How Lay Theories of Organizing

Complicate Coordinationin Organizations,22 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 153 (2000); Roberto A. Weber & Colin F. Camerer, Cultural Conflict and Merger Failure: An Experimental Approach (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). More typical,
however, is the attempt to see how group settings affect individual behaviors. See, e.g., Cass
R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law),
107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1991) (reporting experimental jury data on the group polarization
effect).
3
JeffreyJ. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, CognitivePsychology and Optimal Government
Design, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 549, 560 (2002).
4
There are three examples that I consider most noteworthy: (1) the risk of hindsight
bias is mediated by rules such as the business judgment rule that temper the inability to
accurately assess risk once a negative event has occurred, seeJeffreyJ. Rachlinski, A Positive
PsychologicalTheory ofJudgingin Hindsigh4 65 U. CH. L. REv. 571 (1998); (2) the bias toward
majoritarian default rules, i.e., contractual rules that attempt to anticipate what parties
would likely bargain for, corresponds to the "stickiness" of default rules and the difficulty
that individuals have in breaking from these, see Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and
Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998); and (3) the increasing legal bias in
favor of protecting the employment of long-term employees despite the at-will rule of employment may arguably correspond to the likely endowment effect on employees of their
job-holding, see Samuel Issacharoff, ContractingforEmployment: The Limited Return of the Common Law, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1783 (1996).
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stitutional setting. The role of law is not so much to assist in the process of efficient private ordering but to define the domain of
governmental conduct through a complex maze of institutional practices. Accordingly, it does not necessarily follow that behavioral economic insights may be extended from their modest introduction into
the private law realm where the prototypical interaction is between
private actors, for whom cognitive biases are unmediated. It has been
difficult enough to derive clear answers to problems of institutional
design in private law. 5 Applied to the domain of public law, any legal
reform must have a compelling account (and evidence) of how a superior institutional design will emerge, and such clear institutional
mandates have been conspicuously few in the legal application of behavioral insights.
The limited experience with direct institutional translation of behavioral decision theory should be treated as a deep concern in public
law (and the subset of administrative law), for this is an area of law
that does not exist except through complex institutional structures.
At the very least, it is a difficult methodological proposition to both
extend a field that is largely established experimentally at the level of
individual decisionmaking to a conspicuously different realm of public life and to simultaneously claim great traction at the institutional
level. Even more problematic is the claim, at the heart of this Symposium of "getting beyond cynicism," that the insights derived from behavioral decision theory may already be sufficient to supplant public
choice theory as a descriptive account of the public realm.
II
ADMINISTERING THE STATE

The key problem of administrative law is the trade-off between
expertise and democratic accountability. 6 Agencies typically may
claim greater expertise in the subject matter they oversee, but admit
of less authority in setting policy or answering through the political
process for the consequences of their policy decisions. The great battle lines of administrative law, reflected through leading cases such as
Chevron7 and Vermont Yankee,8 may be seen as turning on the deference
that should be afforded to expertise as opposed to the risk of moving
critical decisionmaking further from the domain of formal governmental structures. For those who see the agencies primarily as an
5 This is a theme I have already addressed in Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a
Behavioral Law and Economics7, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1729 (1998).
6 For a fuller account of this tension, see Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein,
Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Cut. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1995).
7 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
8 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519

(1978).
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arena subject to capture by interest groups, public choice theory provides an elegant analytic method and the claim of nondelegation provides its accompanying constitutional prod. 9 For agency enthusiasts,
by contrast, the administrative state must rely on expert judgment to
fill the inevitable lacunae in statutes 10 and should be given a broad
deferential swath by judicial overseers.
Behavioral decision theory intersects these debates in two primary ways, as set forth in Articles by Professor Seidenfeld" and by
Professors Rachlinski and Farina. 12 First, it offers a theory of governmental error that draws from the cognitive failures of policymaking
officials (as opposed to the venality of their having been overtaken by
rent-seeking private agents). Second, and more richly, behavioral decision theory offers an account of the types of errors that lay generalists (such as legislators) are likely to make, and contrasts those to the
greater reliability of experts, while also giving an account of the distinct vulnerability of experts and the role of lay institutions in checking those sources of likely error.
The first of these insights does not tap a rich vein for setting policy, particularly when standing alone. The argument that "poor [governmental] decisions are often the result of fallibility rather than
culpability," as concisely framed by Rachlinski and Farina, i3 does not
refute the public choice claim that errors borne of capture exist in the
administrative state. That there may be other sources of error does
not eliminate the public choice claim, in the same way that claiming
that broken gas mains cause great harm after earthquakes does not
dispel the fact that earthquakes themselves are perilous. Moreover,
the argument that there may be cognitive failures at work in the administrative state does not diminish the sense that administrative
processes fail not randomly but predictably in favor of powerful inter9 One that has yet to see its fruition in Supreme Court doctrine, it should be noted.
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (refusing to adopt the nondelegation doctrine). Compare Brief for the Petitioners at I, American Trucking (Nos. 99-1257,
99-1426) (setting forth the question presented as "Whether Section 109 of the Clean Air
Act ....
as interpreted by the Environmental Protection Agency... effects an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power"), available at 2000 WL 1010083, with American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 462 (stating the question presented as "Whether § 109(b) (1) of the Clean
Air Act... delegates legislative power to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency").
10
This argument has a long pedigree but can certainly be thought of as a core component of the Hart & Sacks "legal process" approach. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROcESS: BASIc PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPuCATION OF LAWv (William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); accordWilliam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword:Law asEquilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REv. 26
(1994).
11 Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing; Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. Riv. 486 (2002).
12 Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 3.
13 Id. at 554.
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est groups. It is difficult to conjure up regulations requiring a powerful dairy lobby to color butter a shade of pink so as not to confuse
users of oleomargarine, 14 or permitting everyone to prescribe eyeglasses except the well-organized optometrists. 15 Perhaps the examples of random error are there, but they do not leap to mind quite so
readily as to make one want to discard all claims derived from public
choice theory.
The more interesting claim, and the one that commands the core
of the two Articles, is the issue of the comparative strength of expert
versus lay decisionmakers in defining policy objectives and carrying
them out successfully. The experimental literature that both Articles
rely upon indicates that experts are less likely to make certain sorts of
predictable errors, such as overestimating the likely recurrence of
vivid events, and more likely to gain some adaptive ability to overcome
erroneous judgments as a result of repeat encounters with specific factual scenarios. As Professor Seidenfeld points out, this is consistent
with the literature on group decisionmaking, which "indicates that
groups tend to outperform individuals in making many decisions, in16
cluding solving problems that require analysis and evaluation."'
Both Articles properly acknowledge the limits of the ability of experts
to overcome heuristic deficiencies, but nonetheless retain confidence
that, on balance, experts are more likely to have a better understanding of matters within their purview than lay generalists. At the same
time, experts are subject to three distinct biases of their own. First,
they are likely to overestimate their actual knowledge. In the experimental setting, they demonstrate levels of confidence in their judgments that exceed the actual advantages conferred by their expertise,
the propensity to be "often wrong, but never in doubt." Second, they
are likely to adopt a world view that turns largely on the area of their
expertise and are unable to weigh its relative merits against other matters outside the zone of their expertise. As Isaiah Berlin once put it,
"to a cobbler, there's nothing like leather."1 7 Third, and relatedly,
they are subject to routinized ways of approaching problems and to an
unreflective "group think" style of inbred behavior.
The strength of this line of inquiry is that it begins at the core of
what behavioral decision theory does best: explaining the types of reasoning that individuals are likely to undertake in particular settings.
14
Cf Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Stoy of
Butter and Margarine,77 CAL. L. REv. 83, 84 n.3 (1989) (describing the butter industry's
attempts to prescribe the color of margarine).
15 Cf Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding the
constitutionality of a statute allowing only optometrists and ophthalmologists to prescribe
eyeglasses).
16 Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 530.
17 IsuAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE Fox 24 (1953).
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Starting from this vantage point, both Articles ask what sorts of institutional mechanisms might be devised that would best harness the
greater decisional accuracy of administrative experts, while not succumbing to either their excessive confidence or their field-driven myopia. Although the two Articles start from different premises, it is
interesting to note that they converge on a prescriptive recommendation: outside review of agency decisionmaking focusing largely on the
processes used to arrive at agency policy determinations. For
Seidenfeld, this emerges from a narrower inquiry into judicial review
of agency rulemaking under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of
review. For Rachlinski and Farina, the prescriptive recommendation
follows from recasting administrative law as starting from the assumption that agencies are trying to make good decisions and that when
they err they do so as a result of defective processes rather than subverted ends. In either case, the main prescriptive recommendation
looks much like a defense of a rather generous arena for agency activity accompanied by a hard-look standard of judicial oversight. In
other words, the outcome is fairly recognizable as more or less the
state of administrative law as it stands.
III
BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS AND POSITIVE LAW

Indeed, it is useful to compare the administrative world developed through the behavioral decision theory with the Supreme
Court's most recent pronouncement on non-Chevron deference to
agencies-that is, the role ofjudicial oversight of agency action that is
not an interpretation of the underlying statutory standard, but its implementation. In United States v. Mead Corp., 18 the Court confronted
Mead's challenge to a tariff-classification ruling by the United States
Customs Service, arguing that imported day planners should not be
considered "[d]iaries, notebooks and address books, bound," a category subject to a 4.0% tariff, but should fall under the "other" category, not subject to tariff.19 The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
United States provides that the Customs Service shall fix final classifications of merchandise subject to the rules laid down by the Secretary
of the Treasury, which in turn devolved to administrative "ruling letters" issued by any of the forty-six port-of-entry Customs offices. 20 The
question before the Court was whether such diffuse, low-level adminis21
trative decisionmaking was entitled to Chevron deference.
18
19
20
21

121 S. Ct. 2164 (2001).
Id. at 2170.
Id. at 2168.
Id. at 2171.
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In harmony with the insights from behavioral theory, the Court
created a presumption of deference to administrative expertise in
those circumstances evincing the greatest procedural regularity and
the maximum ability for outside input:
It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively
formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and
deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.
Thus, the overwhelming number of our cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed the
fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking
22
or formal adjudication.
Absent such procedural regularity, the agency can claim only the less
deferential Skidmore standard of review, in which the court reflects
both upon the experience and information available to the agency
and the procedures used to reach the ruling:
Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmores holding that an agency's
interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form, given
the "specialized experience and broader investigations and information" available to the agency, and given the value of uniformity in its
administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law
requires ....
...

Such a ruling may surely claim the merit of its writer's thor-

oughness, logic and expertness, 23its fit with prior interpretations,
and any other sources of weight.
The Court's focus on process regularity is strikingly consistent
with the conclusions of the two Articles on the mechanisms most likely
to overcome the particular biases built into expert groups, while preserving the gains that may be achieved through such administrative
expertise. As summarized by Seidenfeld:
The most complete review of the literature on the psychology of
accountability suggests that for accountability to improve the quality
of decisionmaking it must satisfy the following four prerequisites:
(1) the decisionmaker must be aware that he will have to explain his
decision prior to making any irrevocable commitments to that decision; (2) he must perceive the audience to which he explains the
decision as legitimate; (3) he must not know the identity of the audience that will hear his explanation; and (4) he must believe that
the basis for the audience's evaluation of the decision will be pro24
cess- rather than outcome-based.
Translated into administrative law doctrine, Rachlinski and Farina use
the cognitive insight to defend hard-look review:
22
23
24

Id. at 2172-73 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2175-76 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944)).
Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 512-13.
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Hard-look review forces an agency to articulate the factors it considers relevant to its decision, engage in some perceptible assessment
of alternative courses of action, and respond to meaningful comments by outsiders. Cognitive psychological research indicates that
one of the best mechanisms for reducing overconfident judgments
is forcing oneself to consider alternatives and carefully review argu25
ments against one's position.
In normal legislative action, the advantages gained by accountability
to other governmental entities not sharing the same biases and expertise are built into the normal functions of checks and balances. Thus,
the judiciary, in reviewing ordinary legislation, does not represent the
sole branch capable of assuring that reasoned deliberation has been
brought to bear on a problem. According to Rachlinski and Farina,
such process-based judicial review is all the more necessary in the administrative setting because "[a] gency decisional protocols typically
do not replicate the broad multi-perspectivity provided by bicameralism and presentment."26 But, consistent with Seidenfeld (and with
Justice Souter's majority opinion in Mead), the review advocated by
Rachlinski and Farina is not an invitation to substituting substantive
judgments: "Significantly, however, all of the intensity of hard-look review is directed toward identifying flaws in the agency's decisional
27
process."
That these two Articles end up pointing in the direction in which
the law has generally evolved should not be either surprising or dispiriting. The strongest claim that can be made on behalf of expertise is
that it is, in effect, experience tested. Through repeat confrontations
with a problem, errors that may trigger heuristic deficiencies in lay
actors may be overcome, or at least compensated for. It is no stretch
to think of the law, particularly the incremental case-centered process
of common-law reasoning, as just that sort of experience-based expertise that should be expected to approach (through hesitating and uneven steps) sensible mechanisms to overcome some of the frailties of
individual human actors. 28 The de-biasing technique advocated in
both Articles looks like the welcome cousin of the familiar legal-process refrain of procedural regularity and structural accountability.
25 Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 3, at 588. A slight modifier from research in which
I participated indicates that forcing a party not simply to consider but to actively formulate
arguments against herself is the most effective "de-biasing" technique. See Linda Babcock
et al., Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 LkW & Soc. INQUIRY 913, 916
(1997).
26 Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 3, at 589.
27

Id.

28 This claim relates to a broader debate in political theory. Professor Hayek makes a
similar efficiency argument on behalf of the common law. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek May Be Right, 30J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001) (summariz-

ing the Hayekian insights).
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IV
THE ViRTuE OF SMALL STEPS

Although the two Articles converge on a set of prescriptive conclusions based on behavioral studies, they depart significantly in the
critical realm of how far they wish to push their conclusions and how
much weight they ascribe to their methodological contributions. Professor Seidenfeld frames his Article only as a modest defense of judicial oversight of rulemaking under the arbitrary-and-capricious
standard of review. It draws from the cognitive literature a defense of
judicial review as improving the quality of rulemaking decisions. Critically, however, it recognizes that there are a number of other variables
that play into the overall impact of agency rulemaking that may compromise the gains from judicial oversight, including the costs of delay
and the additional costs of internal procedures. Its claimed contribution is the introduction of complex psychological influences on
agency decisionmaking, even while recognizing that such an additional line of inquiry cannot conclusively resolve "whether, overall, ar29
bitrary and capricious review is good or bad."
By contrast, the Rachlinski and Farina Article is more venturesome in its conclusions and, to my mind, weaker as a result. Nowhere
is this more evident than in a sketchy section on how behavioral decision theory compels greater judicial openness to the use of legislative
intent in statutory consideration. 30 Here the authors take a weak insight-"To the extent that legislative materials are written by committees and others with expertise, they can help convey an expert's view
of the underlying policy concerns" 3 1-and attempt to infuse this with
sufficient authority to quell a high-level debate over the extent to
which legislative history may be used in statutory interpretation. This
step too far falls for three separate reasons.
First, this somewhat storybookish version of legislative committees
sitting to deliver the benefits of their collective wisdom does not engage the deep debates over the nature of statutory interpretation. In
the work of leading scholars such as Professor John Manning 32 and
Dean William Eskridge, 33 to name just the authors of the most significant recent contributions to this field, the debates about the role of
judges in statutory interpretation takes on major issues of historical
legitimacy, separation of powers, and democratic accountability. To
29
30

Seidenfeld, supranote 11, at 491.
Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 3, at 594-96.

31

Id. at 594.

32 See, e.g.,John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REv.
1 (2001).
33 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandingsof the "Judicial
Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLuM. L. REV. 990 (2001).
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be rather blunt, the limited insight that legislative committees may
bring some expertise to addressing particular problems unreflected in
the statutory text is unlikely to cause even a ripple in these debates.
Second, even without addressing the public choice concerns, the
process of committee report preparation is rife with the risk of expert
overconfidence and a detachment from the values and priorities of
the general public-the very concerns that Rachlinski and Farina introduce in their discussion of the need for judicial oversight of administrative agencies. Indeed, in their contrast of agency decisionmaking
with the normal processes of legislative enactment, Rachlinski and Farina find the former inferior because "[a]gency decisional protocols
typically do not replicate the broad multi-perspectivity provided by bicameralism and presentment."3 4 It is difficult to credit committee reports, often written after the fact of the legislation, as well as legislative
history in general, as having the same quality of bicameralism and presentment as attaches to statutes proper.
Finally, there is the public choice problem. The fact that committees may bring expertise to bear does not defeat the proposition that
they may also be particularly subject to capture, as the authors acknowledge by citing the risk that legislative history might be "surreptitiously doctored by interests that could not succeed openly in the
lawmaking process." 35 Nor does it defeat the claim that the lack of
oversight and accountability in the final form of enacted legislation
compounds the risk of democratic illegitimacy in the use of legislative
history as a substitute for textual authority. This is obviously a complicated story and one that is not to be resolved here. To a large extent,
this may require empirical proof as to the frequency with which private-regarding concerns crowd out public needs in the contested terrain for legislative attention. But it is worth cautioning the
proponents of a new methodology against claiming more for their approach than they can support. That there are important psychological dimensions to decisionmaking does not negate the claim that
there are also important political, institutional, and economic dimensions as well. Proving that there are well-motivated reasons for error
unfortunately does not mean that there are not also malevolent reasons operating as well.
CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the contribution to be gleaned from the first introduction of behavioral decision theory to the administrative law realm
will turn on two questions. The first is whether the descriptive ac34
35

Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 3, at 589.
Id. at 595.
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count has more explanatory power than prior accounts. Here the answer is entirely unclear. Whether reviewing the range of agency
conduct through a psychologically-based prism captures a truer picture of administrative practices than a public choice-based account
remains to be seen. At best, the Articles thus far indicate that there
are alternative interpretive structures to be applied from behavioral
decision theory. The extent of their explanatory power remains to be
seen. Second, there is the question whether the psychologically based
insights, assuming that they are empirically established, would yield
interesting prescriptive conclusions. Here the answer seems both
more promising and comforting. The main thrust of both the
Seidenfeld and Rachlinski and Farina Articles is to buttress the need
for procedural order and institutional accountability. Here the behavioral decision theorists are playing to the lawyers' strength.

